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The global contents of this subject are the following:

 

  • 1. Introduction
    1.1. Strategic decision models: game theory. Individual decision situations versus interactive decision situations.
    1.2. The history of game theory
    1.3. Modelling a trategic decision model. Basic teminology and examples.
    1.4. Extensive form models.
    1.5. Normal form models.
    1.6. Coalitional form models.
    Practical sessions:
    1.1. Read and comment the paper "Génesis y evolución de la teoría de juegos. Sus orígenes en España". Published in BEIO in 2006.
     
  • 2. Non cooperative models
    2.1. Static games with complete information: Nash equilibrium (1950) and Pareto efficiency. Examples.
    2.2. Dynamic games with complete imformation: perfect and imperfect information, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Selten, 1965). Prisioner Dilema.Examples.
    Practical sessions:
    2.1. Application I (Static games): Cournot Oligopoly (1838).
    2.2. Application II (static games): Bertrand Duopoly(1878).
    2.3. Application III (dynamic games): Stackelber leadership model (1934).
     
  • 3. Cooperative models
    3.1. Cooperative games (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1974): with/without transferible utility (TU/NTU). Different kind of TU games.Examples.
    3.2. Cost/Benefit allocations: the imputation set. Examples.
    3.3. Set solutions: the core (Gillies, 1953). Bondareva-Shapley conditions for the non-emptiness of the core. Examples.
    3.4. The core for concave/convex games. Examples.
    3.5. Point solutions: proportional allocations (Moulín, 1988), the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). Examples. Proportional allocations versus the Shapley value and the nucleoulus.
    Practical sessions:
    3.1. Application I: the glove games (Aumann, 1987). The core.
    3.2. Application II: linear producgtion games (Owen, 1975). Core allocations.
    3.3. Application III: the game of producer firms. The core, the Shapley value, and the nucleoulus.
    3.4. Application IV: the airport game (Littlechild and Owen, 1973). The core, the Shapley value, and the nucleoulus. 
     
  • 4. Coordination in logistic and supply chains
    4.1. Cooperation and competition in inventory games (Meca et al., 2003,2004).
    4.2. Horizontal cooperation: inventory games with temporary discounts (Meca et al., 2007), production and inventory games (Guardiola et al., 2008, 2009).
    4.3. Vertical cooperation: relationships among a single supplier and multiple retailers (Guardiola et al., 2007).
    Practical sessions:
    4.1. Read and comment the paper "Supply chain collaboration". Publicado en el libro "Supply Chain, Theory and Applications". Edited by Kordic, I-Tech Education and Publishing, Vienna 2008.
    4.2. Read and comment the paper "Cooperative Game Theory and Inventory Management". Published in Eurpean Journal of Operational Research, 2010
Copyright 2012, Universidad Miguel Hernandez. Reconocer autoría/Citar obra. admin. (2012, June 11). Contents. Retrieved October 20, 2017, from OCW - Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche Web site: http://ocw.umh.es/ciencias/decisionmodels/contents.html. Esta obra se publica bajo una licencia Licencia Creative Commons Licencia Creative Commons
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